Despite the fact that multinational companies (MNCs) in Central Eastern Europe significantly contribute to employment growth in the region, qualitative knowledge about diffusion of employment practices in this region, and about coordination of MNCs with local labour market actors and institutions is still limited. This paper aims to fill this gap by underlining the coordination between MNCs, local actors, and international actors in shaping employment practices, their diffusion from headquarters to the workplace level, and their adaptation to local conditions in Poland. The goal is to explain MNC-driven adjustment to local conditions in employment practices of production workers and industrial relations through which this goal can be achieved. To explain this, we apply several coordination games between management and trade unions in the empirical part of the paper. We argue that the MNC's corporate intention to utilise local conditions, the interactive coordination of the factory management with the local trade union, and an underdeveloped international coordination of trade unions within the MNC are the main factors explaining the specific local employment practices and industrial relations instead of their diffusion from MNC headquarters or other subsidiaries.
INTRODUCTION
Multinational companies (MNCs) belong to organisations functioning simultaneously in various countries and labour markets. Lately, the diffusion of employment practices within MNCs has been at the centre of interest for researchers in the field of industrial relations and human resource management (HRM). Despite a great interest in this topic, not enough attention has been devoted to the interaction between MNCs and local actors, such as trade unions, that shape the diffusion process. Studying procedural interaction, or coordination, between these actors is then a constructive analytical tool in understanding the dynamics of diffusion.
This paper presents an actor-oriented approach to study diffusion of employment practices in MNCs and qualitatively explores employment flexibility and industrial relations in a Polish factory of Electra -a leading Western-European industrial MNCT P 1 P T . Electra belongs to important employers in Poland; yet the Polish business environment, industrial relations and employment practices considerably differ from its home country with a rather heavily regulated labour market. Besides investigating to what extent employment practices in the subsidiary are diffused from headquarters or adapted to local conditions, the paper's aim is to demonstrate the role of coordination between actors that have an impact on employment practices in the Polish site: MNC headquarters, the factory management, workers and their trade union, Homeland trade unions, and the European Works Council (EWC). This model allows not only an explanation of the outcomes of interaction (i.e. developments in working time, pay, and bargaining structures), but also a straightforward analysis of actors' strategies. In this context, the paper offers several new analytical tools and empirical findings.
The paper's second section provides a short literature overview on diffusion of employment practices, followed by an explanation of the coordination model of this study in section three, and hypotheses and research methodology in section four. Section five introduces the studied company.
Empirical evidence and analysis of coordination channels are presented in section six. The seventh section concludes, discusses the findings and addresses implications of this research.
T P T 1 T P T Due to confidentiality, we refer to the company, its organisational units, home country and the location of the Polish factory by pseudonyms.
DIFFUSION OR ADAPTATION OF EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES TO LOCAL CONDITIONS?
A variety of authors conceptualised diffusion for different MNCs. The most important approaches can be summarised in three points:
First, different MNCs can be viewed as innovators, adaptors or reverse diffusers (Marginson, 1992; Ferner and Varul, 2000) . Innovator companies diffuse employment practices from headquarters to foreign subsidiaries in countries where local labour market and employment conditions differ from the MNC's home country (ibid.). Adaptor MNCs prefer adaptation of employment practices to local host-country conditions instead of diffusing common policies from the center (ibid.). Reverse diffusion (Edwards, 1998; Ferner and Varul, 2000) takes place if employment practices originating in subsidiaries are transferred back to the MNC's home country.
Second, Edwards, Rees and Coller (1999) discuss structural and political determinants of diffusion.
Structural factors include the country of origin effect (Ferner, 1997) , degree of international production integration, international management structures, and the method by which an MNC has grown. Besides the structure, political processes within MNCs -based on power resources of both the headquarters and the subsidiary -can foster or block diffusion.
The third conceptualisation stresses the difference between diffusion outcomes and principles, and methods of diffusion. Boyer et al. (1998) argue that various combinations of methods and principles can lead to selective adaptation to local conditions, or in other words, to hybridisation trajectories preferred by MNCs.
Despite the usefulness of the above concepts, more attention should be paid to the fact that whether the company's choice for diffusion or adaptation materialises in specific employment practices depends on the strategic interaction of several actors, including MNC headquarters, local subsidiary management, and trade unions. The coordination model presented in this paper focuses on interaction between the local and the transnational, and is therefore a constructive analytical tool to better understand how and why diffusion of employment practices in MNCs does (not) take place. 
THE COORDINATION MODEL
Coordination is a procedural interaction between actors, concerning priorities and issues of interest of all actors involved; relative to the institutional environment where coordination takes place (Scharpf, 1997) . The most important features of coordination are discussed below.
First, actors are at the centre of each coordination process. As employment practices are collectively regulated in industrial relations and at the same time are a crucial aspect of company HRM, it is important to consider coordination between the management, employer representatives, employees, and employee representatives. Second, actors interact in coordination channels. This paper investigates three coordination channels that are central in shaping workplace-level employment practices in the Polish Electra factory (see also Figure 1 ):
α -coordination between MNC headquarters and the factory management;
β -coordination between the factory management and employees and trade unions (HRM and industrial relations);
δ -(international) cooperation of employee representatives: trade unions and the EWC.
Besides these channels, national legal regulation affects employment practices, but as we are preliminarily concerned with actors' strategies and interactions, we will integrate the legal impact into actors' power resources. The third feature of coordination is the institutional context: actors define their strategies based on their perceptions of existing institutions and relatively to other actors' strategies and opportunities fostered by the local institutional set-up (Scharpf, 1997) .
Fourth, the content of coordination refers to specific employment practices that are the subject of regulation, diffusion, or adaptation: this research focuses on headcount, working time, work organisation, and contract flexibility of production workers (which are called 'directs') in MNCs.
These variables are the core of employment flexibility and are subject to legal regulation and coordination between management and trade unions.P 2
Fifth, the institutional environment and the type of actors shape the constellation of actors and their strategies in coordination. MNCs possibly have different employment strategies in a lightly regulated Polish labour market with decentralised trade unions when compared to centralised industrial relations in Western Europe. We distinguish between strategies of non-coordination and coordination.T P 2 P T Non-coordination refers to a situation where two or more actors do not interact with each other. Coordination can be further divided into cooperative and tough strategies. This dichotomy summarises the gamut of strategies actors can opt for in an analytically convenient way.
Cooperation is a form of coordination when the actor is more inclined to compromise with other actors in the coordination process. Analogically, tough is a strategy when actors do not resign or compromise easily. Later in this paper, we will return to these strategies regarding several forms of flexibility.
Sixth, the constellation of actors is the basis for the mode of coordination, reflecting the power resources attributed to actors and the stability of resulting employment practices:
Coordination by control: entails power of an actor to take decisions and impose these on others (CPB, 1997:57) . The strengths of control are certainty, enforcement, protection against opportunism of other actors, and no need for consultation with a variety of actors. Control may invoke rent-seeking behaviour or restriction of individual freedoms. Effective exercise of control involves high costs of information gathering (ibid.). Control is associated with legislation, a court order or an army (CPB, 1997) . In MNCs, implications of control include, for example, headquarter control over a subsidiary's business processesT P 3 P T . An actor aiming to exercise control prefers a tough T P T 2 T P T Legal regulation applies to working time, recruitment/dismissals, and contracts. The law does not regulate work organisation, but health and safety regulations apply. Harzing (1999) strategy; an actor as a control object is either cooperative or tough, depending on his/her power resources.
Coordination by competition: entails rivalry between actors striving for something that not all can obtain (CPB, 1997:56) . Competition can achieve efficient allocation and provide incentives for individual flexibility, freedom and privacy. Competition may also lead to rent seeking, decrease commitment of actors to long-term agreements, and produce a socially unacceptable income distribution (ibid.). Competition is observed in market interactions dominated by price signals.
Within a company, competition can occur between actors on the same level of hierarchy, i.e. between a unionised and a non-unionised workforce. The strategies of actors in competition are tough, since all actors are assertive in reaching their goals. Actors can achieve a consensus at the price of large concessions and (threats of) industrial action.
Coordination by common values and norms: congruent set of preferences within a group of people (CPB, 1997:57) . Repeated interaction fosters solidarity, consensus, and common values in a community or a company. Actors are strongly motivated and committed to achieve their common goal: complying with common values and norms decreases opportunistic behaviour. Company culture is an example of common values, but value sharing is present in virtually all coordination channels, i.e. common local interests of management and unions, or international trade union solidarity. Cooperation is the most adequate strategy in this mode of coordination.
Coordination by interactive bargaining or cooperative exchange: bargained consultation and cooperation between otherwise independent parties with different preferences (CPB, 1997:58) .
Emergent trust between actors, or their position vis-à-vis each other based on the institutional environment in which they operate, are crucial elements in this type of coordination. Due to an increased flow of information between actors, their knowledge about each other's situation increases and mutual learning raises the quality of coordination and improves its effectiveness.
Actors are motivated to stay alert, innovative, and will exploit existing opportunities in order to achieve their goals. Supplier relationships and industrial relations are examples of interactive bargaining (ibid.). In a company, bargaining can occur in all mentioned coordination channels, i.e. between headquarters and the subsidiary, or collective bargaining with trade unions. Both cooperative and tough strategies can be applied, depending on actors' power resources.
Next, instruments of coordination refer to tools through which specific outcomes concerning coordination contents are implemented with respect to the mode of coordination through which these outcomes were achieved. For example, control of management over the workforce can be implemented in a form of individual performance-related appraisals, but also as a control of selection in job upgrading.
Finally, outcomes of coordination can be conceptualised in the form of diffusion of employment practices or their adaptation to local conditions. Based on this model, we empirically investigate the functioning of coordination relevant for workplace-level employment flexibility and industrial relations in a single MNC case study. We raise the following research question: What is the mode and the form of coordination in each of the distinguished channels, and how does coordination affect the development of factory-specific employment practices? Related to that, we ask whether we can speak about diffusion of employment practices, or rather of their adaptation to local conditions.
Our aim is to learn which mode of coordination dominates which coordination channel, what strategies best characterise the actors and their payoffs, what employment practices arise as a consequence of such interactions, and whether these resemble diffusion or adaptation to local conditions. Since a particular coordination channel is not described exclusively by one mode of coordination but can simultaneously embody several modes of coordination depending on its content and instruments, we were concerned with the dominant mode of coordination that best describes the studied channels.
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
To answer our research question, we formulate three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 -coordination between Electra headquarters (Homeland) and the Polish factory (α):
In order to fulfil corporate targets of the MNC, we expect the headquarters to control the factory's performance through a diffusion of employment practices: fostering regular contacts with the factory management, deploying specified employment policies to the workplace and closely monitoring their implementation, and using expatriates and central decisions to control the employment practices. If control by headquarters is the dominant coordination mode in channel α, headquarters will opt for a tough coordination form. At the same time, the factory management is expected to act in a cooperative manner because of its dependence on the headquarters. Control then is supported by common company values.
Hypothesis 2 -coordination between the Polish factory management and the factory-based trade union representing workers (β):
We distinguish between coordination outcomes (directs' employment practices) and the coordination process (industrial relations). In both of these, we expect interactive bargaining to be the dominant coordination mode between the factory management and the local trade union. The expected management's action is determined by headquarter control (hypothesis 1 above); however, we assume that local managers have a better knowledge of social processes at the factory level than the distant headquarters, and therefore can better evaluate the usefulness of local conditions for the company goals -either unilaterally, or via coordination with the local union.
Factory-level compromises are then achieved in a form of coordination in which both the management and the union play with a tough bargaining strategy. Interactive bargaining is enabled through additional coordination channels determining managerial and union strategies in the factory:
expected managerial control over the workforce driven by high unemployment in the region;
competition between non-unionised and unionised workforce driven by the management; and common values of management and the union to prevent the factory's relocation.
Hypothesis 3 -transnational coordination of unions, employee representatives, and the relationship between employees and unions (δ):
Homeland trade unions do not directly benefit from the relocation of Electra's production to
Poland; therefore, we presume that the dominant coordination mode of these trade unions will be cooperation with trade unions in Poland, supported by value sharing and international solidarity, in order to increase the Polish unions' power resources vis-à-vis employers. Unions both in the West and in Poland are expected to have cooperative strategies. The same is expected for employee representatives within the EWC.
The main research method to examine the above hypotheses was qualitative interviewing using semi-structured questionnaires. In 2004, the first author conducted 42 interviews with managers, trade union representatives, EWC representatives, and external respondents at Electra's headquarters and in the Polish factory. Figure 2 lists the interview respondents.
Figure 2: Interview respondents
Organisational level Respondents, number of interviews Management subsidiary General manager (1); HR manager (7); HR specialist (5); Production managers (3); Corporate communication manager (1); Shift leaders (4) Headquarters Poland
Country HR manager (1); Industrial HR manager (1) Business unit: HR manager (1); Industrial strategy manager (1) Product Division: International HR audit specialist (1) Headquarters (1); Former production worker Electra Wilno (1) Managers and trade union representatives on all relevant levels of the hierarchy were interviewed.
All interviews but one took place in the respondents' offices without participation of third persons.
All interviews were tape-recorded; one interview lasted on average 65 minutes. The first author also collected company statistics, reports and presentations, and visited the factory's shop floor.
Participation in a company event enabled the author to also observe informal interaction i.e. between managers and trade union leaders in a casual environment.
In the next section of this paper, we provide empirical evidence and analyse the studied coordination channels. We start with a brief description of Electra, its Polish factory, and the factory-level industrial relations.
THE ELECTRA COMPANY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Electra is one of the world's largest industrial companies in the relevant sector and the largest in Europe, according to the amount of sales in 2003. Electra employs over 164,000 employees in over 60 countries (EIP Briefing Document, 2004) . Facing the challenges of internationalisation of markets and increased competition, Electra has undergone several reorganisations in the past 15 years. Being organised in a top-down hierarchy, the current corporate strategy stresses integration of various levels and activities, which requires a development of a cooperative culture to capture convergence opportunities (Electra EWC, 2001) . Therefore, coordination channels transcending the traditional organisational structure are fostered mainly in core business activities and support activities,
including HRM of knowledge workers and managers.
In Poland, Electra belongs to important Western-European investors employing over 10,000 employees in Electra sites (mostly manufacturing jobs), and more than 10,000 through local attempts, a group of 10 female directs convinced other workers that a union would be useful in order to improve work conditions. The union became part of Solidarnosc, and was accepted by EIP's management without reservations. The unionisation level at EIP is about 30%, twice as high as the Polish averageT P 7 P T , with the majority of union members being directs. Since the union is based inside the factory, frequent informal interaction with workers and (potential) members is well developed and the union does not face a membership decline.
Gradually, both EIP management and the union learned to interact with each other. Originating in a country with centralised sectoral and company collective bargaining, even the expatriate managers at EIP did not have considerable experience in factory-level bargaining with unionsT P 8 P T . Electra headquarters did not interfere in the process of building up industrial relations at EIP Wilno; therefore, rules of management-union interaction developed almost exclusively on the site. As the outcome, both bargaining parties respect the jointly established rules and avoid (threats of) industrial action, with a single exception of a collective conflict solved by a court mediator in 1998.
Moreover, Polish Electra managers appreciate the unions' awareness of business processes, which allows productive union-management interaction in business-related and employment-related issues.
Although both managers and unionists view their relationship as open and friendly, and claim to have decent industrial relations, evidence suggests that coordination between the parties is to a certain extent based on tough strategies. The union's strategy is to keep employment in Wilno, increase employment security and relate to that increase its control over the workforce. This strategy is linked to the fact that high unemployment in the region allows considerable power asymmetry between management, workers, and the union. Since dual employment flexibility became the factory's priority only in the years, when the union was already functioning, it is likely that managers saw an opportunity to channel employment flexibility measures to the directs via the relatively weak trade union.
Already for several years, the most important content of union-management interaction includes negotiations on work regulations, annual working time calendars and their operational revisions, and annual salary increases. The rule to discuss all changes in the calendar with the union was established locally and is based on the legal stipulation that working time issues are subject to such negotiation.
According to the union, directs better accept decisions as to whether they will work or not on agreements apply to all factory employees, except the management team and several key position holders. Such agreements are signed in a written form, however, not in the form of a collective agreement, and without an effective sanction mechanism in case of non-implementation of agreed stipulations. The non-existence of collective agreements at EIPT P 9 P T allows for managerial freedom in operational decisions, as well as for an implementation of performance-related pay that is part of the direct workers' monthly salary.
After this brief introduction of the case study, we will now turn to analysing the relevant coordination channels that influence employment practices in the Polish factory. 
ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION CHANNELS
In this section, we provide empirical evidence on the functioning of coordination between headquarters, the factory management, and employee representatives, and on factory-specific employment practices that are the outcome of studied coordination.
COORDINATION BETWEEN MNC HEADQUARTERS AND THE FACTORY

MANAGEMENT (CHANNEL α)
From the MNC's organizational chart, two coordination channels can be identified between Electra headquarters and the Polish factory (see Figure 3 ): first, it is the functional channel through the product division and the business unit; second, it is the regional channel via European and Polish headquarters. 
Source: authors' summary based on company documents and interviews
According to acquired data we can conclude that there is a consistency in policies between different levels of headquarters (corporate, functional, and regional). Therefore, we restrict α only to coordination between functional headquarters and the EIP Wilno management.
Direct coordination between headquarters and subsidiaries in employment practices materialises in I.e. the mini-company concept was based on experience of a Western-European Electra factory
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FACTORY
MANAGEMENT AND THE LOCAL TRADE UNION (CHANNEL β)
Local conditions, including high unemployment, lack of job opportunities in the region and the availability of young, motivated workforce considerably increased EIP's labour market authority.
Although the company provides fair working conditions and payments to its workers, it comes at the expense of high employment flexibility that is, besides favourable labour costs, an important source of the factory's competitiveness. The main aspects of employment flexibility related to directs include: headcount, contract structure, working time, and work organisation.
First, the share of directs on the total headcount varies between 77 and 87% according to upgrading, an increased salary, change from temporary to permanent contracts, or a prospective temporary job in the next year's season.
In contrast to the contract flexibility of directs, indirects are relatively stable in number and contract structure (see Figure 4 ). The third aspect of employment flexibility is the working time of directs that has been developed locally, utilising Polish labour law. To secure the company's ability to increase and decrease production output within short periods of time (on a weekly basis), min-max contracts have been deployed: workers are minimally paid for 50% of legally stipulated working time even if they stay at home due to low production plans. However, if production increases, these directs work according to the factory's needs, whereas their working time varies between 50% and 100% of the standard 40-hour-week. The workers are then paid according to the actual hours worked. This arrangement decreases the employer's financial burden and permits high flexibility. Acknowledging flexibility of both contracts and working time, we refer to this arrangement as to dual employment flexibility. Finally, work organisation -directs' allocation to production lines, seats, and their rotation -is the last studied aspect of employment flexibility. A group of multi-skilled employees, called butterflies, has been trained to avoid production stoppages in case of regular workers' breaks or absence occurring anywhere in production. Moreover, directs work in mini-companies of 9-10 persons, and rotation Managers prepare work schedules on a monthly basis. Workers are informed one month in advance on which days and which shifts they will work. In case of operational changes or delays in production inputs, changes are adopted even more often (source: EIP shift leader). The union finds that workers are informed about their schedule too late; in some cases just 2 days ahead (source: EIP union leader).
like to see more company-level centralisation -as in Electra in HomelandT P 19 P T -but in Poland, a decentralised factory-level bargaining and utilisation of regional labour market differences prevails.
To put the management-union coordination in channel β in more formalized turn, we use a basic game-theoretical methodology (Scharpf, 1997) : we define actor constellations and payoffs relative to the actors' constellations and to the institutional environment in which coordination takes place.
Payoff matrices help us to relate findings in each studied coordination channel with our hypotheses.
We list payoffs numbered from 0 to 3 for both management and the union, acknowledging the fact that coordination is a continuous process with repetitive interactions. The choice of numbers is based on convenience and the only relevant aspect of this selection is its ordinal structure based on empirical information. To find the expected outcome of actors' coordination we adopt the Nash Equilibrium conceptT P 20 P T
where the equilibrium combination of strategies is the one from which none of the actors has incentives to deviate, given the strategies played by the other agents. This method is suitable, because the β channel differs from the α channel in that the actors are assumed to be independent from each other and are not in a hierarchic relationship.
In the β channel, the autonomy of EIP's factory management significantly affects the constellation of the factory management and the union. Both actors are relatively independent from their headquarters; therefore, coordination β is embedded in local conditions. We decompose β into three games played between the management and the union concerning: working time, contract flexibility, and work organisation. The constellation and strategy of both actors is determined by relatively weak trade union powers to influence employment practices and flexibility, and the nonexistence of collective agreements, which allowed EIP to develop the employment flexibility model conforming to Polish labour law, but at the same time, limiting trade union involvement in decisions concerning employment flexibility, except fields where union-management negotiations are legally stipulated (pay negotiations and working time negotiations). Furthermore, the strategy of management and the union is shaped by a common value to safeguard employment in Wilno. The union strategy is also based on the effort to increase union control over the workforce, and the management strategy is dominated by the factory's effort to perform best when compared to other comparable factories within and outside Electra.
Although not part of sectoral bargaining, collective bargaining is centralised for all Electra sites in Homeland.
T P T 20 T P T Osborne and Rubinstein (1994: 14) . Figure 5 shows the union-management coordination for selected aspects of the β channel: Figure 5a . Figure 5b . Figure 5c . Coordination strategies in work organisation (β)
Management
In working time issues (Figure 5a) , the union has relatively the largest power resource based on legal stipulations; therefore, it is a better strategy for management to cooperate with the union in working time issues, since by being tough the company can lose its reputation of a good employer, face court cases and suffer extra costs. For the union, it is also better to opt for cooperation as long as the management cooperates. In this case, the Nash equilibrium game means that the management cooperates with the union on working time issues and adheres to institutions established because of the existence of effective legal sanctions for the employer. The fact that EIP management negotiates its annual working calendar and operational changes with the union supports this finding. The union appreciates this cooperation; however, if a company would opt for being tough, the union would also shift to being toughT P 21 P T . This happened at the end of 2003 when the union and the management could not find a consensus concerning working time recognition of three individual workers. As a result, the union invited the Labour inspection and the management had to face effective sanctions. To sum up, the 'cooperation-cooperation' strategy is the most sustainable mode of coordination between EIP management and the trade union in working time issues.
The constellation of actors and their payoffs in contract flexibility in Figure 5b differ from coordination related to working time, since the availability of skilled labour and high unemployment in the region increase the power of the management vis-à-vis the union. Although regulated by law, the union failed to extensively influence the contract structure. In this case, the equilibrium game played is 'tough-tough': by being tough in respect to the union, EIP has the highest payoffs in the form of employment flexibility irrespective to union strategiesT P 22 P T . As the union has to face a 'tough' employer, being tough is also a dominant strategy for the union. Through this, the union maximises at least the benefits it can reach with its weak position. For example, in 2003, in order to avoid dismissals of workers (which would have been the worst option for the union), the union opted for the second-
For the union, '3' means a higher payoff than '0' in the right column of Fig. 5a .
For management, payoffs in the right column are higher than payoffs in the left column. worst strategy and agreed to change contract types of full-time directs to three quarters time contracts.
Work organisation, analysed in Figure 5c , differs from the previous two aspects in that no legal obligation to negotiate the work organization with trade unions applies. Therefore, the union has very limited powers in affecting the work organisation at EIP, because work organisation is a domain of management and the management's responsibility is higher than the union's responsibility. In this case, managers play a 'tough' strategyT P 23 P T , to which the union optimally reacts by playing a tough strategy as well, in an attempt to maximise its payoff in this situationT P 24 P T . Most of this interaction occurs through informal communication channels through which the union signals its eventual concerns related to work organisation. An effective sanction mechanism to penalise the company in case of no commitment to adopted contract structure or work organisation is not in place, since the company developed these employment flexibility measures internally and, in case of contract structure, according to Polish labour law.
To integrate the previous arguments and to propose a broader view on the β channel, Figure 6 shows a general payoff matrix applicable to factory-level industrial relations at EIP. The payoffs listed in this Figure are not a summary of previously discussed employment flexibility aspects: 
Factory industrial relations (β)
As the figure suggests, both the EIP management and the union play a 'tough-tough' game, which suits the decentralised structure of Polish industrial relations: in this sustainable coordination model, the employer attempts to maintain its bargaining power over the relatively weak union, and the union is better off by maximising its possible gain relative to the existing power asymmetry.
Nevertheless, the 'tough-tough' game does not mean that the actors experience conflicts; instead, they realise that better results can be reached through interactive bargaining with compromises, i.e.
T P T 23
T P T Payoffs in the right column are higher than in the left column.
T P T 24
T P T In the right column,'2' is a higher payoff for the union than '1'. operative changes in working time calendar of the factory achieved via mutual cooperation, adjustments in contract structure, and informal union feedback on work organisation. Although the union is relatively weak, EIP has a well functioning interaction with the union when compared to stylised local employers. Both the management and the union view this as an equilibrium model (relative to local conditions) where no major changes should be introduced in the relationship.
Overall, looking back at the four figures related to management-union coordination (β) and returning to hypothesis 2 on the outcomes and the process of this coordination, we formulate several further insights: Regarding the outcomes of coordination, in employment practices EIP does not adapt to local conditions, but utilises these to the company's flexibility needs. Given that sanction mechanisms are lacking, adaptation would mean that the company would be less concerned with the agreed rules. Second, adaptation would mean lower employment flexibility, which is the case in the majority of local and foreign employers not linked with Electra Wilno. Finally, with adaptation to local conditions, we would expect more open-ended contracts, and severance payments when dismissing employees with such contracts. Given these points, the conclusion is that β is neither diffusion, nor adaptation, but utilisation of local conditions through negotiated agreements and interactive bargaining with a relatively weak trade union, where being tough is the most sustainable strategy for both management and the union.
We confirm hypothesis 2 also regarding the coordination process, and argue that industrial relations are characterised by interactive bargaining, with the union being recognised as a legitimate bargaining partner, although weaker than the management. MNCs have in this respect a good reputation in Poland in contrast to small foreign companies and Polish employers. The supporting coordination channels included in hypothesis 2 are also confirmed: we found management control over the directs through individual worker evaluations and selection procedures. In this case, management plays a tough strategy, and directs do not have any other option but to cooperate. However, we did not find evidence that management promotes competition between unionised and non-unionised workers; both groups are treated equally. Finally, we can confirm the existence of shared values between the union and managers; namely, the wish of both actors to maintain a well-performing factory, and commitment to jointly established rules.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION COORDINATION AND THE EUROPEAN
WORKS COUNCIL (CHANNEL δ)
International coordination of trade unions, the European works council at Electra, and the workplace-level union-workers relationship is the final coordination channel to be analysed.
Opposite to our expectations, we find that regular international contacts among trade unions at Electra in Poland, Homeland, and other countries are limited. "National, international or global cooperation is not the first priority of [Homeland] workers and unions"T P 25 P T . Electra's Polish unions initially expected more cooperation with Western unions and were disappointed by the lack of interest from Homeland, however, they understand that "there are no sentiments in business"T P 26 P T , especially when factories face internal MNC competition.
The only functioning channel through which international cooperation is assured is the European works council (EWC); however, the relationship between representatives from Homeland and Poland in the EWC is competitive rather than cooperative. According to Western-European employee representatives, the role of EWC at Electra is limited to discussions dominated by Electra headquarters. This channel does not yet play a significant role in bridging local differences in structure and power of employee representatives. Despite its limited role, evidence suggests competition between involved representatives from Western Europe and CEE.
In the recent years, international union cooperation at Electra has been more important than the EWC. Trade unions are expected to be more eager to cooperate internationally in order to decrease the threat of social dumping for Western European countries and the emigration of their industries to lower-wage countries in CEE (Scharpf, 1997: 81) According to payoffs in the matrix (based on interviews with trade union representatives, and challenges and threats that unions have to face), we identified two sustainable equilibrium outcomes:
unions either cooperate with each other in order to lobby for higher regulation standards; or they compete with each other in order to maintain the local employment regulation and promote advantages of local variety. The first case characterises the national-level union cooperation; however, the evidence for company-level union cooperation at Electra supports the second option. The next feature of the δ channel is the coordination between the workers and the union in the EIP factory. This relationship can be characterised by interactive bargaining with cooperative strategies, where feedback from workers concerns mainly their working time and contracts. A threat to the stable union position is a decreasing solidarity among workers that is driven by shop floor employee competition. Although this competition does not depend on union membership but is based on managerial control to increase individual performance of directs, it is a serious concern for the union.
To summarise the finding on δ, we conclude that international company-level trade union coordination is dominated by competition that further deepens the embeddedness of employment regulation into local conditions and supports the persistent institutional and structural variation in industrial relations between centralised Western Rhineland economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and decentralised CEE economies such as Poland. This argument runs against our hypothesis 3 on international union cooperation and solidarity. The EWC of Electra can possibly play this role in the future, but in the current state of cooperation the further development of this institution remains to be seen. Therefore, based on our current findings, hypothesis 3 is rejected.
As our analysis suggests, the greatest impact on factory-specific employment practices is ascribed to the locally embedded coordination between the factory management and the factory trade union.
The impact of both MNC headquarters and trade union headquarters is limited.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we showed the dominant modes and forms of coordination in three coordination channels, and evaluated the impact of these on factory-specific employment practices. However, before we turn to the concluding arguments, we must emphasise that each coordination channel can be simultaneously characterised by several modes of coordination. In other words, we can find control, competition, value sharing and interactive bargaining in all coordination channels. Figure 8 summarises empirical evidence on the variety of coordination modes in each of the channels:
Figure 8
Various modes of coordination in various coordination channels concerning the factory's performance in order to avoid production relocation and job losses at Wilno. As this example suggests, there is no exclusivity between various modes of coordination in different channels.
Mode of coordination
Since the strength of different coordination modes varies we found the dominant mode of coordination that best describes the channels α, β, and δ. We formulate three conclusions in response to our research question:
First, in channel α we find that the production workers' employment practices at EIP are not 
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